of "failing to prevent bribery." The sole defense companies have to this crime is the nigh impossible task defense of demonstrating that the company had "adequate procedures" in place to prevent such bribery. Moreover, since the Act characterizes small facilitation payments, currently made all over the world in the ordinary course of traveling or conducting business, as "bribes", business as now conducted may have already triggered the Bribery Act's strict liability crime of failing to prevent bribery. Furthermore, this will be the case even for a non-UK business if it is found to be "carry[ing] on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom [.] " 3 The surprising hypocrisy of Parliament criminalizing facilitation payments and, in certain instances, hospitality expenditures, while acknowledging that these are daily occurrences by both UK and non-UK companies, seems inexplicable. It is certainly indefensible.
Part I outlines the United Kingdom's leisurely pace of bringing its laws into compliance with the OECD Convention -a process that began on December 17, 1997 and was completed more than thirteen years later on July 1, 2011, when the Bribery Act finally became effective. Part II analyzes three offenses created by the Bribery Act -bribing another person, 4 requesting or agreeing to receive a bribe, 5 and bribery of a foreign public official. 6 Part III explores what in our view is the most egregious aspect of the Bribery Act, the strict liability corporate crime of failing to prevent bribery/ a crime that requires no mens rea and triggers unlimited fines. Parts I to III of this article draw on language from our previous article, Expansive Reach -Useless Guidance: An Introduction to the UK Bribery Act 2010.
8
Part IV probes the expansive scope of what is deemed a "bribe" under the Bribery Act. Once a bribe is alleged, a non-UK business doing only a part of its business in the United Kingdom will be guilty of failing to prevent a bribe even when such bribe was paid by a non-employee or other person over whom the now automatically guilty company has no operational control. In such a case, the sole defense available to the presumptively guilty company is to satisfy the burden of proving that, despite the occurrence of the alleged bribe that it failed to prevent, that company had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent that very bribe! We intend to show that the Bribery Act's operative provisions, particularly the strict liability provisions and the treatment of facilitation
B. The OECD and Other Anti-Bribery Conventions
In 1997, twenty years after the FCPA went into effect, OECD member nations completed preparation of the OECD Convention. The OECD Convention obligates parties to enact domestic legislation criminalizing bribery of foreign government officials. 16 Subsequent to negotiation of the Convention, five other anti-bribery conventions have GUIDE TO THE FCPA). The Bribery Act does not contain a requirement that a company maintain accurate books and records. Such a provision is contained in Part 15 of the UK Companies Act 2006, Section 386.
12. RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FCP A, supra note 11, at 4 -5. 13. !d. at 5. 14. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b)-3(b) (1998); S. REP. No. 100-85, at 53 (1987) ; H.R. REP. No. 100-40, pt. 2, at 77 (1987) . A "routine governmental action" is only ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; processing governmental papers; providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country; or providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration. The term does not include any decision by a foreign official whether or on what terms to award new business to or to continue business with a particular firm. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(t)(3).
15. See, e.g ., James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign bribery and American Business after 1977 (Nat'! Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995) .
16. OECD Convention, supra note 1, at art.l § 1. "Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business."
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UNSCREWING THE INSCRUTABLE been negotiated, four of which are now in effect. The five are as follows:
• United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003. 17 • The broadest in scope of these international expressions of disapproval of bribery and corruption is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, which binds 140 states and has twenty additional nations currently dealing with ratification? 3
C. The Adequacy of Prior UK Corruption Legislation
The United Kingdom is an original member of the OECD and was an initial signatory of the OECD Convention in December 1997. As noted, the Convention requires parties to enact domestic legislation to make it a crime to pay bribes overseas in pursuit of business. After signing the OECD Convention, the British government took the position that its existing domestic anti-bribery legisla~ion satisfied this requirement. This existing 17 One official entity with special expertise in this area, the UK Law Commission, an independent body that periodically reviews the laws of England and Wales, 30 flatly contradicted the government position by declaring immediately after the OECD Convention had been signed: "Under the present law, the English courts do not have jurisdiction to try a criminal offence unless the last act or event necessary for its completion occurs within the jurisdiction."
31 Very clearly, however, the Bribery Act criminalizes acts of companies, even non-UK registered companies, which take place entirely outside the United Kingdom.
The 37. "The Salmon Commission in 1976 recommended that such doubt should be resolved by legislation, but this has not been acted upon. We believe that it would be unsatisfactory to leave this issue outstanding when other aspects of the law of Parliament relating to conduct are being clarified. We recommend that the Government should now take steps to clarify the law relating to the bribery of or the receipt of a bribe by a Member of Parliament. This could usefully be combined with the consolidation of the statute law on bribery which Salmon also recommended, which the government accepted, but which has not been done. This might be a task which the Law Commission could take forward. In December 2005, two years after the Joint Committee Report and eleven years after the United Kingdom signed the OECD Convention, the Government, through the Home Office, sought public comment (referred to in the United Kingdom as a "consultation") on the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916. 44 By March 2007, thirty years after the FCPA was enacted, the results of this consultation were made public. 45 The bottom line of the consultation was simply that there was no consensus on the approach a new act should take.
46
A significant development during this period, and one which appears to have moved the government and Parliament to finally take definitive action, was the BAE Systems plc ("BAE") bribery scandal. In December 2004, BAE, the largest defense contractor in the United Kingdom, first publicly confirmed that it was being investigated by the Serious Fraud Office (the "SF0") 47 63 From there, it was relatively speedily passed by both houses of Parliament, receiving Royal Assent on April 8, 2010. Even then, however, this law did not immediately go into effect. As described in Part III.C., infra, Section 9 of the Bribery Act required the government to publish guidance prior to the effective date of the Act to help businesses understand how to comply with the incomprehensible requirements of Section 7, the crime of failing to prevent bribery. 64 The Ministry of Justice published final guidance to the Bribery Act 2010 on March 30, 2011 ("Guidance"). 65 The Bribery Act 2010 became effective on July 1, 2011.
66
Regardless of the years of delay, the Bribery Act is now in effect. We analyze the operative provisions of the Act in Parts II, III, and N, infra.
II. BRIBERY ACT: SECTIONS 1, 2, AND 6
In Part II, we discuss three of the four substantive provisions of the Bribery Act. Section 1 of the Act prohibits what has been referred to as "active" bribery -the offering or payment of something of value to another.
67 Unlike the exclusively foreign focus of the FCPA, Section 1 applies to domestic UK bribery as well.
68 Section 2, dealing with "passive bribery," proscribes receipt of a bribe. 69 This offense also has general applicability, including within the United Kingdom. Section 6 outlines the offense of bribing a foreign public official. (1) A person ("P") is guilty of an offence if either of the following cases applies.
70

A. Section 1: Bribery of Another Person
(2) Case 1 is where-( a) P offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another person, and (b) P intends the advantage-(i) to induce a person to perform improperly a relevant function or activity, or (ii) to reward a person for the improper performance of such a function or activity. (3) Case 2 is where-( a) P offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another person, and (b) P knows or believes that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity. (4) In case 1 it does not matter whether the person to whom the advantage is offered, promised or given is the same person as the person who is to perform, or has performed, the function or activity concerned. (5) In cases 1 and 2 it does not matter whether the advantage is offered, promised or given by P directly or through a third party.
72
Section 1 prohibits a person (either directly or indirectly) from offering, promising, or giving a financial or other advantage to another. This is a general bribery offense applicable both within the United Kingdom and abroad. An offense under Section 1 includes not only payments of money, but also offers, promises, or gifts of "financial or other advantage."
73 Any such action constitutes a Bribery Act offense even without carrying through with the offer or promise of a payment or advantage; the offer or promise completes the offense. 74 A Section 1 offense is limited to circumstances where the party making the payment intends the "advantage" so proffered to induce the recipient to improperly perform an act or to reward the recipient for having done so. 75 The offense is also completed when a party offers such an advantage knowing that 71. Expansive Reach, supra note 8, at 325-26.
72. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § I.
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UNSCREWING THE INSCRUTABLE 75 acceptance of the advantage will result in the improper performance of a relevant function or activity.
76
The key distinction between case 1 and case 2 described in Subsections (2) and (3) of Section 1 of the Act is the person to whom the advantage is offered. In case 1, it does not matter whether the person to whom the advantage is offered is the same person who is to perform, or has performed, the activity. In case 2, the person whose acceptance of the advantage constitutes an improper performance must be the same person to whom the advantage is offered. Moreover, in case 1, the advantage must be intended to induce or reward the improper performance of a relevant function or activity, whereas in case 2, the acceptance of the advantage itself is the improper performance. In summary, a person offering an "advantage" as described in Section 1 is guilty of active bribery if this was done with intent either to induce the recipient to act improperly or to reward the recipient for having done so. The offeror is also guilty of bribery where the recipient's acceptance or agreement to accept is itself improper.
B. Section 2: Acceptance of a Bribe
Section 2 of the Act describes the offense of "passive bribery," in which the perpetrator requests or agrees to receive a bribe. This section provides:
( 1) A person ("R") is guilty of an offence if any of the following cases applies.
(2) Case 3 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage intending that, in consequence, a relevant function or activity should be performed improperly (whether by R or another person). (6) In cases 3 to 6 it does not matter-( a) whether R requests, agrees to receive or accepts (or is to request, agree to receive or accept) the advantage directly or through a third party, (b) whether the advantage is (or is to be) for the benefit of R or another person. (7) In cases 4 to 6 it does not matter whether R knows or believes that the performance of the function or activity is Improper. (8) In case 6, where a person other than R is performing the function or activity, it also does not matter whether that person knows or believes that the performance of the function or activity is improper.
77
For this offense, one does not need to receive a bribe, but merely ask for or agree to receive it, and the bribe need not be monetary. It can be a simple "advantage." As with active bribery, the action must be improper: the actor needs to do, or intend to do, something wrong. The improper conduct could be intended to be done by a third party, or a third party could be the source of the bribe. 78 As we have noted elsewhere, "the irony of labeling this offense as passive bribery, and yet defining the four cases constituting varieties of the receipt of a bribe using the term 'requests,' was apparently lost on Parliament."
79 As UK Professor Peter Alldridge has remarked: "Calling it passive bribery ... rather misses [the] point." 80 C. Sections 3 and 4: "Relevant Function or Activity" and "Improper Performance" Sections 3 and 4 of the Act set forth the broad range of activities to which the Act applies and the meaning of "improper" performance as used in Section 1. As noted, a Section 1 offense is committed where the "advantage" is intended to either induce a person to perform improperly a relevant function or activity or reward a person for the improper performance of such a function or activity. 81 The same offense is committed Section 3 provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Act a function or activity is a relevant function or activity if-( a) it falls within subsection (2), and (b) meets one or more of conditions A to C. (2) The following functions and activities fall within this subsection-( a) any function of a public nature, (b) any activity connected with a business, (c) any activity performed in the course of a person's employment, (d) any activity performed by or on behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or unincorporate ). (3) Condition A is that a person performing the function or activity is expected to perform it in good faith. (4) Condition B is that a person performing the function or activity is expected to perform it impartially. (5) Condition Cis that a person performing the function or activity is in a position of trust by virtue of performing it. (6) A function or activity is a relevant function or activity even ifit-(a) has no connection with the United Kingdom, and (b) is performed in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom. (7) In this section "business" includes trade or profession. 83 Thus, a "relevant function or activity" includes any public or business activity performed in the course of employment 84 that also meets one of three conditions: it is normally expected to be performed in good faith, is performed impartially, or is performed by a person in a position oftrust. 85 It
must be emphasized that the acting party is guilty even where the relevant function or activity is carried out abroad; such activity need not have any connection to the United Kingdom, and the measure of what is "improper" is determined by UK standards, not by those of the foreign country where the bribing occurs. 86 This application of UK standards to transactions occurring in foreign nations with different societal mores and cultures will doubtless trigger accusations of "cultural imperialism" comparable to those previously raised in connection with application of the FCP A. 
"Improper Performance"
Section 4 provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Act a relevant function or activity-( a) is performed improperly if it is performed in breach of a relevant expectation, and (b) is to be treated as being performed improperly if there is a failure to perform the function or activity and that failure is itself a breach of a relevant expectation. (2) In subsection (1) "relevant expectation"-( a) in relation to a function or activity which meets condition A or B, means the expectation mentioned in the condition concerned, and (b) in relation to a function or activity which meets condition C, means any expectation as to the manner in which, or the reasons for which, the function or activity will be performed that arises from the position of trust mentioned in that condition. (3) Anything that a person does (or omits to do) arising from or in connection with that person's past performance of a relevant function or activity is to be treated for the purposes of this Act as being done (or omitted) by that 79 person in the performance of that function or activity. 88 Thus, according to this section, a relevant function or activity is performed improperly if it is performed in breach of a relevant expectation, or if there is a failure to perform the function or activity, and that failure is a breach of a relevant expectation. 
"British "Expectations"
Section 5 of the Act elaborates on the term "expectation," as that term is used in Sections 3 and 4, and makes perfectly clear that the test of what is expected is a test of expectations in the United Kingdom. 90 The full text of Section 5 is as follows:
( 1) For the purposes of sections 3 and 4, the test of what is expected_is a test of what a reasonable person in the United Kingdom would expect in relation to the performance of the type of function or activity concerned. (2) In deciding what such a person would expect in relation to the performance of a function or activity where the performance is not subject to the law of any part of the United Kingdom, any local custom or practice is to be disregarded unless it is permitted or required by the written law applicable to the country or territory concerned. (3) In subsection (2) "written law" means law contained in-(a) any written constitution, or provision made by or under legislation, applicable to the country or territory concerned, or (b) any judicial decision which is so applicable and is evidenced in published written sources.
91
Once again, the Bribery Act requires that UK standards apply to conduct that occurs in other nations. The breach of a relevant expectation, for purposes for Section 4, follows a reasonableness test, based only on what is considered "reasonable" in the United Kingdom, and any local custom or practice is generally to be disregarded.
88. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 4.
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D. Section 6: Bribery of a "Foreign Public Official"
Section 6 of the Act is the section that most directly parallels the FCPA offense of bribery of a foreign public official. Section 6 describes this offense as follows:
(1) A person ("P") who bribes a foreign public official ("F") is guilty of an offence if P's intention is to influence F in F's capacity as a foreign public official.
(2) P must also intend to obtain or retain-( a) business, or (b) an advantage in the conduct ofbusiness. (3) P bribes F if, and only if-( a) directly or through a third party, P offers, promises or gives any financial or other advantage-(i) to F, or (ii) to another person at F's request or with F's assent or acquiescence, and (b) F is neither permitted nor required by the written law applicable to F to be influenced in F's capacity as a foreign public official by the offer, promise or gift. (4) References in this section to influencing F in F's capacity as a foreign public official mean influencing F in the performance of F's functions as such an official, which includes-( a) any omission to exercise those functions, and (b) any use ofF's position as such an official, even if not within F's authority.
92
To trigger liability under the Bribery Act, the bribe must be paid to a foreign public official. Who qualifies as such an official is defined in Section 6(5):
"Foreign public official" means an individual who--(a) holds a legislative, administrative or judicial position of any kind, whether appointed or elected, of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom (or any subdivision of such a country or territory), (b) exercises a public function- For the purpose of this Convention: a) "foreign public official" means any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international organization.
94
A "public international organization" is defined in Section 6 of the Bribery Act:
"Public international organisation" means an organisation whose members are any of the following-(a) countries or territories, (b) governments of countries or territories, (c) other public international organisations, (d) a mixture of atiy ofthe above.
95
Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice asserts in the Guidance that an offense under Section 6 has no jurisdictional limit: a foreign public official includes anyone, whether elected or appointed, who holds a legislative, administrative, or judicial position of any kind of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and includes: [Vol. 23:1 country or territory or who exercises a public function for any public agency or public enterprise of such a country or territory, such as professionals working for public health agencies and officers exercising public functions in stateowned enterprises.
96
Such an official "can also be an official or agent of a public international organisation, such as the [United Nations] or the World Bank."
97
The policy underlying Section 6 addresses "the need to prohibit the influencing of decision making in the context of publicly funded business opportunities by the inducement of personal enrichment of foreign public officials or to [sic] others at the official's request. "
98 While such activity is likely to involve conduct amounting to improper performance of a relevant function or activity, to which Section 1 applies, the Guidance explains that Section 6 does not require proof of improper performance or an intention to induce such performance. " [T] he exact nature of the functions of the persons regarded as foreign public officials is often very difficult to ascertain with any accuracy, and the securing of evidence will often be reliant on the co-operation of the state any such officials serve." 99 The Guidance states that "it is not the Government's intention to criminalise behaviour where no such mischief occurs, but merely to formulate the offence to take account of the evidential difficulties referred to above." 100 However, this statement provides no useful "guidance" at all, and will serve only to trouble those who regularly interact with foreign public officials and will now have to worry about their every move.
E. Section 12: Jurisdictional Nexus to the United Kingdom
Section 12 sets forth the scope of jurisdiction of the various operative provisions of the Bribery Act. Subsections (1) through (4) apply to Sections 1, 2, c and 6 of the Act and are standard and unexceptional. They provide as follows:
Offenses under this Act: territorial application 96. Guidance, supra note 65, at~ 22 (emphasis added). 97. Id. This expands slightly on the text of the OECD Convention, which provides that a foreign public official means any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international organization. OECD Convention, supra note 87, [Vol. 23:1
Kingdom or elsewhere.
101
This jurisdictional nexus to the United Kingdom is traditional. The territorial basis for jurisdiction is explicit in Subsection (1 ). 102 Nationality jurisdiction is set out in Subsection (2).
103 Under Subsection 2, a natural person subject generally to UK laws is subject to the Bribery Act even when acting outside the United Kingdom. These provisions are parallel to provisions of the FCPA as most recently amended in 1998 to comply with the OECD Convention. 104 Subsection (5), however, thrusts the Act into a new, perilously overbroad area of hitherto untested, and in our view unjustified jurisdiction. "An offence is committed under section 7 irrespective of whether the acts or omissions which form part of the offence take place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere."
105 This Parliamentary language contrasts starkly with the 1998 opinion of the legal experts on the Law Commission previously cited in Part I.C: "Under the present law, the English courts do not have jurisdiction to try a criminal offence unless the last act or event necessary for its completion occurs within the jurisdiction." 106 SFO Senior Staff have explained that the test for jurisdiction is whether the company in question carries out business in the United Kingdom, and that this is also a fact-specific inquiry to be made on a caseby-case basis.
107 This means that to resolve each particular factual setting, the defendant non-UK business entity must go to trial -incurring significant costs and delays to determine whether it is actually subject to the expansive grasp of the Bribery Act. The SFO has also made quite clear that it "intends to assert broad jurisdiction under the provisions of the Bribery Act."
108 This jurisdictional overreach of the Bribery Act applies only to Section 7, which creates the unique, strict corporate liability crime of failing to prevent a bribe, which does not require fault or any inkling of mens rea. Given the central role of London in many aspects of international business, this crime may apply to almost all transnational businesses, including those with only the slightest connection to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, as detailed in Part IV, infra, the Bribery Act's version of a "bribe" includes The Bribery Act's Section 7, "Failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery," is innovative, unprecedented, and indefensible as applied to non-UK registered businesses. It is a strict liability crime applicable to a business "doing business or a part of a business in the UK."
109 While the Bribery Act has several unclear, ambiguous provisions, Section 7 is by far the most objectionable. As we explained in Part II.D, supra, Subsection 12(5) of the Bribery Act imposes no territorial limits on the applicability of the unique crime of "failure to prevent bribery." As described more fully in Part IV B, infra, following its careful review of the issue, the Law Commission's draft bribery bill did not include strict liability for failing to prevent bribery. Because London is a world class financial center, travel hub, and attractive international destination, the crime of failing to prevent a bribe is potentially applicable to most of the world's business entities that have cross border operations.
As its justification for asserting this vast extraterritorial reach for the Bribery Act, the SFO reported that it has been approached by UK companies complaining about competitors in foreign countries that are paying bribes. The SFO recognized the disadvantage compliance with the Act will pose and stated that one of its objectives is "to prevent ethical companies from being competitively disadvantaged by the actions of other companies whether they are within or outside the UK." 110 This is somewhat ironic since no UK firm, including BAE, had ever been prosecuted in the United Kingdom for overseas bribery until 2009. This was twelve years after the OECD Convention was signed, when the first, and only, violation was penalized as the result of a company self-reporting a breach of the u111iedNatiol1srraq oil for Fooifsanct1ons.U 1 ----------we now tum to a closer analysis of the offending provisions of Section 7. This section reads in relevant part:
(1) A relevant commercial organisation ("C") is guilty of an offence under this section if a person ("A") associated with C bribes another person intending-( a) to obtain or retain business for C, or (b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct (Feb. 23, 2011) , available at http://www.sfo.gov.UK/press-room!latest-press-releases/press-releases-2011/mabey--johnsonltd-former-executives-jailed-for-helping-finance-saddam-hussein's-govemment.aspx.
[Vol. 23:1 ofbusiness for C. (2) But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with C from undertaking such conduct. (3) For the purposes of this section, A bribes another person if, and only if, A-( a) is, or would be, guilty of an offence under section 1 or 6 (whether or not A has been prosecuted for such an offence), or (b) would be guilty of such an offence if section 12(2)(c) and (4) were omitted.
(4) See section 8 for the meaning of a person associated with C and see section 9 for a duty on the Secretary of State to publish guidance.
112
To fully appreciate the broad scope of Section 7, we need to determine the meaning of "relevant commercial organization" and of "person associated" with such an organization. In the Bribery Act, these terms are ambiguous,
elusive, and open-ended.
A. Relevant Commercial Organization
The application of Section 7 to a UK commercial enterprise is not troubling. Such an organization is a "body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere)," or "a partnership which is formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere)."
113 This portion of the definition is unexceptional, reflecting traditional territorial jurisdiction. UK domiciled entities are subject to the strict criminal liability of Section 7 (with only the defense set out in Section 7(2)).
114 It is well accepted that if an organization is established in any part of the "United Kingdom," Parliament has the power to legislate as it sees fit.
115
As described infra, however, Parliament determined that Section 7 is equally applicable to "(b) any other body corporate (wherever incorporated) This should have been good news for the many foreign companies which have secured listings on, for example, the London Stock Exchange. However, Richard Alderman, at the time head of the SFO, the agency principally charged with enforcing the Bribery Act, flatly contradicted the Ministry by stating his view of SFO jurisdiction.
Asked whether all companies listed in the UK potentially fall under the remit of the Bribery Act, he said: "Exactly. You bet we will go after foreign companies. This has been misunderstood. If there is an economic J~_ngag~mt;:l1Lwitl1_ the _ _ _ _ Ql( __ then in l11Y __ yie\V they are carrying on business in the UK. 121 For the present it is extremely unsettling for companies that might be ensnared by Alderman's grandiose view of his jurisdiction under the Bribery Act to see authoritative UK spokesmen expounding inconsistent views on what is, by any measure, an extraordinarily far-reaching provision.
B. "Adequate Procedures " Defense
Parliament claimed to ameliorate the draconian impact of the automatic imposition of criminal liability for failing to prevent a bribe by offering one possible defense to the crime, the marvelously labeled "adequate procedures" defense. Section 7(2) provides, "But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with C from undertaking such conduct."
122 With the establishment of the strict liability Section 7 offense, when seeking to find liability in a legal entity, the prosecutor need no longer search for the person representing the "controlling mind" of the company. 123 No criminal intent or knowledge, no guilty mind or mens rea, is required for this crime. If a "bribe" within the Bribery Act's very broad meaning of that term occurs, 124 have been put on notice by the head of the Serious Fraud Office that they will be fair game once the biggest overhaul of the nation's bribery laws in a generation comes into force. Richard Alderman, the agency's director, is charging his investigators with rooting out bribery anywhere in the world when the legislation is introduced on July 1. The Bribery Act's sweeping powers mean that companies based overseas come under the SFO's jurisdiction if they have any business link with the UK, such as being listed here." Caroline Binham, SFO Chief Warns of New Global Reach, FINANCIAL TIMES (May. 23, 2011, 10:34 pm) , http://www.ft.com/ intl/cms/s/0/8c056ce2-8562-11 e0-ae32-00 144feabdc0.htrnl#axzz 1 irn4Khs Y A.
121. See, e.g., GUIDANCE, supra note 65, 1[ 34 "The courts will be the final arbiter as to whether an organization 'carries on a business' in the UK taking into account the particular facts in individual cases." !d.; Dunn Article, supra note 108, at 2 ("However, they made clear that the test for jurisdiction is simply whether the company in question carries out business in the United Kingdom. They noted that case law relating to this question will not necessarily be relevant to determining jurisdiction, and this will be a matter of fact in each case, clarifying that the SFO intends to assert broad jurisdiction under the provisions of the Bribery Act.").
122. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 7(2). 123. The "controlling mind" element of a corporate prosecution under prior UK law required proof that a very senior executive of the defendant corporation actively and knowingly affected the bribe. This is the stated explanation for why there were so few corporate defendants prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Acts Use of the term "adequate" is curious, since obviously had the procedures actually been adequate, the bribery would not have occurred in the first place.
126 Substitution of the term "reasonable" was considered and rejected in Parliament. 127 The UK Law Commission published a Summary of its Recommendations, which explained the Section 7 defense in the following terms: "[I]t will generally be sufficient guidance to those in a position to make payments to say: Do not make payments to someone (or favour them in any other way) if you know that this will involve someone in misuse of their position."
128 However, this statement is perfectly circular. To say one cannot engage in bribery because it is bribery is unusually unhelpful. When the Law Commission Report was being considered by legislators, testimony to the Joint Committee of Parliament considering the draft Bribery Bill challenged the public policy basis of Section 7: "We fail to see why public policy should require that individual's actions be crirninalized and for the individual to then to rely on a prosecutor's discretion, on whether with hindsight, the public interest requires a prosecution." 129 The final version of the Act retained the strict liability provision of the draft along with the adequate procedures defense.
C. The Ministry of Justice's "Guidance"
In the clearest possible acknowledgement of the unique challenge posed by Section 7 and its sole affirmative defense, Parliament included in the Act a highly unusual provision. Section 9 130 requires that the UK 130. Section 9 provides, in relevant part: "The Secretary of State must publish guidance about procedures that relevant commercial organisations can put in place to prevent persons associated with them from bribing as mentioned in section 7(1)." Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 9.
government provide guidance to the business community to explain how to comply with the strict liability offense of "Failing to Prevent Bribery." Upon careful review of the Ministry of Justice Guidance, published in final form in March 2011, eleven months after the Bribery Act was enacted, one can only conclude that the Guidance is not a useful guide to complying with the Act and avoiding Section 7 liability. In his March 2011 Introduction to the final Guidance, Kenneth Clarke, the Justice Minister, offered this disclaimer of responsibility: "The question of whether an organisation had adequate procedures in place to prevent bribery in the context of a particular prosecution is a matter that can only be resolved by the courts taking into account the particular facts and circumstances of the case. "
131 Thus, the Justice Minister confirmed that the question of how a company is to comply with Section 7 of the Act is actually impossible to describe. While the Guidance characterizes Section 7(2) as a "full defense" to a violation of the strict liability crime of failing to prevent bribery, it makes clear that the burden is on the guilty organization to prove this defense providing that "[i]n accordance with established case law, the standard of proof which the commercial organisation would need to discharge in order to prove the defence, in the event it was prosecuted, is the balance of probabilities."
132
Rather than offering a clear route to satisfactory compliance with Section 7, something we may presume Parliament had in mind when it required the Guidance to be published prior to the entire Act becoming effective, 133 the Justice Ministry's Guidance simply repeats that the seemingly impossible burden is upon the guilty company to prove that its procedures were adequate, despite the failure of those procedures. While the Guidance offers six principles that serve as criteria to be used in determining whether companies had in place "proportionate procedures" for preventing bribery, the Ministry acknowledged that these principles "are intended to be flexible and outcome focused, allowing for the huge variety of circumstances that commercial organisations find themselves in." 134 Thus, companies cannot practically rely on the Guidance to assist them with the "huge variety" of scenarios in which they might find themselves.
It bears emphasizing that the Guidance itself, while mandated by Section 9, 135 is not law, does not have the force of law, and merely expresses what some in the current Government think, hope, or believe. Even if the Guidance was clear, and it is not, it could not be relied upon.
131. See GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 4. 132. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 33. 133. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 9. 134. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at p. 20. 135. "The Secretary of State must publish guidance about procedures that relevant commercial organisations can put in place to prevent persons associated with them from bribing as mentioned in section 7(1)." Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 9 (U.K.).
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The Courts may find it interesting that the Guidance provides that decisions to prosecute must be guided by a "common sense" approach.
136 But this is not an especially useful guide for business, and the courts will certainly come to their own independent conclusions. Governments change. And once an ambitious prosecutor has made the decision to proceed under a particular set of attractive facts, and the media seek to boost sales by hyping another "corporate scandal" on its 24/7 news cycle, stale statements of the intentions of a prior government will likely provide little protection for a business automatically found guilty under Section 7.
N. So THEN, WHAT IS "BRIBERY?"
Our review of the phrase "part of a business" in Part liLA. supra established that almost any commercial organization engaged in international business may find itself subject to prosecution under the Bribery Act. Given the unhelpful nature of the Guidance and the apparent attempt by Parliament to regulate international transactions with precious little connection with the United Kingdom, it is vital to fully understand just how broad the scope of the term "bribe" is as used in the Act if a company is to avoid the unlimited fines of the automatic crime of failing to prevent a bribe.
A. The New Definition of Bribe
Section 7 applies to a "relevant commercial organization." 137 In the globalized world of the twenty-first century where, for many purposes, electronic communications and the ease of international travel have virtually eliminated sovereign borders for businesses, any "relevant commercial organization," no matter its jurisdiction of organization or its primary business focus, may become subject to the Bribery Act if it can be argued that such organization does "part" of its business in the UK. Given the borderless application of the Bribery Act promised by its enforcers, we do need to understand the boundaries of what constitutes an actionable "bribe" under the Act. To make clear the expansive scope of the Bribery Act, we consider the meaning of "associated person," and two additional terms: "facilitation" payments and "hospitality" expenses.
"Associated Person"
Section 7 provides that the act constituting the alleged "bribe" 136. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at 2, 15. "And, as I hope this guidance shows, combating the risks of bribery is largely about common sense, not burdensome procedures." GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at 2.
137. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 7(5).
triggering potential criminal liability can be made by "a person associated with" such organization as long as that person had the intent to obtain or retain business or an "advantage" for such organization. 138 The Bribery Act defines an "associated person" in Section 8:
(1) For the purposes of section 7, a person ("A") is associated with C if (disregarding any bribe under consideration) A is a person who performs services for or on behalf of C.
(2) The capacity in which A performs services for or on behalf of C does not matter. (3) Accordingly A may (for example) be C's employee, agent or subsidiary. (4) Whether or not A is a person who performs services for or on behalf of C is to be determined by reference to all the relevant circumstances and not merely by reference to the nature of the relationship between A and C. (5) But if A is an employee of C, it is to be presumed unless the contrary is shown that A is a person who performs services for or on behalf of C.
139
The potential for expansive use of this definition by SFO prosecutors is starkly evident. Subsection (4) explains that "all the relevant circumstances" are more significant than the nature of the actual relationship of that individual to the organization. This renders the term "associated person" even more ambiguous and significantly expands the potential reach of this strict criminal law. 140 Based upon a straightforward reading of Subsection 8( 5), executives and other employees of an organization are presumed to be associated with an organization. 141 We have to accept that all employees, even temporary or part-time employees, are subject to the presumption in Subsection 8( 5) that places the burden of proof upon the company to establish that the particular employee who is said to have effected a bribe was not, under "all the relevant circumstances," performing services "for or on behalf of' the company. 142 However, the US common-law definition of "agent" would likely be applied to the FCP A. Under the common law, "[a]n agent is a person or entity that has been either explicitly or implicitly authorized to act on behalf of [a principal]"; " [ w ] hen the agent acts within the scope of its authority, the principal can be held liable for the agent's actions."
143 As reported FCPA cases reveal, local "consultants" have been used in an attempt to circumvent the FCPA's bribe standard.
144
Hiring local persons to act on behalf of a company is a common practice in international business. Having such persons handle payments to local officials is a practice well known to prosecutors. Including local consultants who clearly do perform services for a business as "agents" for purposes of determining "associated person" is essential and not at all controversial. However, business in the twenty-first century also necessarily involves reliance upon many other types of what may be colloquially referred to as agents. These may include a very wide scope of persons and other businesses -delivery and maintenance people, designers, computer programmers, etc., all of whom perform services and may thus be deemed "associated" with a business. Commercial organizations, subject to, or that may be subject to, the Act would certainly benefit from useful guidance on how to avoid liability when dealing with such agents.
With respect to the term "subsidiary" in Subsection 8(3), Parliament has not singled this term out for special treatment, but rather, has lumped subsidiaries together with "employee" and "agent." It is logical to agree with Parliament's decision to overcome the long-standing fictional "separate existence" of a corporate subsidiary and to accept that acts taken by a wholly-owned subsidiary are, in fact, acts done "for or on behalf of" its
142. The FCPA provides, "[i]t shall be unlawful for any domestic concern ... , or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such domestic concern ... , to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, [or] parent.
145 Genuine questions, however, arise under Section 8 for joint ventures and for subsidiaries that are not wholly-owned. Where ownership of a subsidiary is shared with others, the subsidiary may well still be performing services for or on behalf of the company. Is that partial parent always to be held responsible for bribes made by such subsidiary? Even for entities organized under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction? Even for bribes completely unrelated to the services such subsidiary or joint venture does perform for the company? Even when the company has "adequate procedures" overall, but because of its partial ownership arrangement, does not have operational control of the joint venture or subsidiary where the bribe occurred? These questions arise because the Act does not specify what is to be done when such situations arise, and the Guidance does not help at all.
The Guidance does not distinguish between wholly-owned and partially-owned subsidiaries.
146 Rather, the Ministry of Justice focuses on the overall intent requirement of the Act, stating that "[ w ]ithout proof of the required intention [to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business for the organization], liability will not accrue through simple corporate ownership or investment, or through the payment of dividends or provision of loans by a subsidiary to its parent."
147 The Ministry further states, in unhelpful language, that the question of "adequacy of bribery prevention procedures will depend in the final analysis on the facts of each case, including matters such as the level of control over the activities of the associated person . . . "
148 Thus, the Ministry once again states the not-so-helpful assertion that ultimate liability is fact-specific, will rest on the context of each case, and thus must be determined by a court.
Further questions concern entities in a company's supply chain. As the Guidance points out, "an organisation is likely only to exercise control over its relationship with its contractual counterparty" and persons who contract with that counterparty "will be performing services for the counterparty and not for other persons in the contractual chain."
149 The confusion arising from the numerous parties that may be involved in such transactions would provide an aggressive prosecutor with an opportunity to expand the scope of the Act even further. While many laws that businesses 145. See, e.g., Mazza v. Verizon Washington D.C., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 28, 41 (D.D.C. 2012 ) ("Disregarding the separate identities of a corporate parent and its subsidiary is ... a rare exception grounded in equity considerations, and is only to be applied when adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would sanction a fraud or promote injustice. face are carefully crafted with somewhat ambiguous terms, providing prosecutors with the flexibility essential to address novel situations, Section 7 of the Bribery Act establishes a corporate crime requiring no affirmative act and with no element of mens rea. Thus, the possibility exists that a person only marginally associated with a company which is only marginally connected to the United Kingdom, may commit an act, whether deliberately or inadvertently, that triggers the strict criminal liability and unlimited fines of the Bribery Act. Such ambiguities in the Act are ill-advised.
Facilitation Payments
Unlike the FCP A, which explicitly permits facilitation payments, 150 the Bribery Act provides no exception for what are referred to as "grease payments," "speed money," "tea money," or "facilitation payments." As described in the FCPA, these are the payments made to facilitate or expedite routine government action that international travelers may experience even in non-commercial circumstances. 151 The Ministry of Justice, in an attempt to justify the Act's hardline stance on facilitation payments, provides in the Guidance:
As was the case under the old law, the Bribery Act does not (unlike US foreign bribery law) provide any exemption for such payments. 19, 19 (2012) available at http:l/moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/06/Furthennore.Diamant.pdf.
151. The PCP A defines "routine governmental action" as "only an action which is ordinarily and commonly perfonned by a foreign official in-(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature." 15 U.S.
[Vol. 23:1 other associated persons, perpetuate an existing 'culture' of bribery and have the potential to be abused.
152
The Guidance explains that these payments could trigger either the Section 6 offense or, "where there is an intention to induce improper conduct, including where the acceptance of such payments is itself improper, the section 1 offense and therefore potential liability under section 7."
153
Various explanations of the United Kingdom's position on facilitation payments, however, contain acknowledgements that a strict prohibition of all such payments will not be easily enforced. [Vol. 23:1 employees as to the procedure they should follow when asked to make such payments, 3. whether such procedures are being followed by employees, 4. if there is evidence that all such payments are being recorded by the company, 5. if there is evidence that proper action (collective or otherwise) is being taken to inform the appropriate authorities in the countries concerned that such payments are being demanded, 6. whether the company is taking what practical steps it can to curtail the making of such payments.
161
If the SFO is satisfied with the answers to these questions, the company, while still in technical breach of the law, will not be prosecuted for making facilitation payments. As noted, there is no current guidance, learning, or lore on what are the "practical steps" demanded by item 6 in this list to eliminate such a ubiquitous practice. Even if such practical steps as might be created did satisfy prosecutors at the SFO, this is far from a "safe harbor." Prosecutors change, especially recently at the SF0. 162 Perhaps more important, business involves economic risk taking. Adding regulatory and legal uncertainty to these economic risks must, at the margin, hurt business.
Moreover, the United Kingdom's past treatment of facilitation payments demonstrates that it has not actually taken the hardline approach that it is now propounding. While it is technically true that facilitation or "grease" payments have always been prohibited under English law, it is equally true that no prosecutions were ever attempted for such payments made overseas. Furthermore, notwithstanding the Justice Ministry's citing of the 2009 OECD "Recommendation," the OECD Convention does not require that these payments be outlawed. Commentary 9 to the OECD Convention as originally published provided:
Small "facilitation" payments do not constitute payments made "to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage" within the meaning of paragraph 1 and, [Vol. 23:1 hospitality payment would be found to be illegal depends heavily on context. 181 The Guidance provides that while expenditure levels are not the only consideration in determining whether a Section 6 offense, bribery of a foreign public official, has been committed:
[I]n the absence of any further evidence demonstrating the required connection, it is unlikely, for example, that incidental provision of a routine business courtesy will raise the inference that it was intended to have a direct impact on decision making, particularly where such hospitality is commensurate with the reasonable and proportionate norms for the particular industry; e.g. the provision of airport to hotel transfer services to facilitate an on-site visit, or dining and tickets to an event.
182
However, the Guidance once again proves itself to be virtually useless to the many companies actually doing business while aware of their obligation to comply with the Bribery Act. Most companies operating internationally now have "compliance officers" whose sole function is to instruct their employers as to what conduct is permitted under the Act. Can a company compliance officer function effectively when her best option is to wait to see whether the SFO prosecutes hospitality?
Indeed, the UK government spokesman at the time of Parliament's consideration of the Bribery Act acknowledged, in January 2010, the scope of the problem with criminalizing hospitality payments:
We recognise that corporate hospitality is an accepted part of modern business practice and the Government is not seeking to penalize expenditure on corporate hospitality for legitimate commercial purposes. But lavish corporate hospitality can also be used as a bribe to secure advantages and the offences in the Bill must therefore be capable of penalising those who use it for such purposes .... Corporate hospitality would ... trigger the offence only where it was proved that the person offering the hospitality intended the recipient to be influenced to act improperly. 184 The accuracy of this statement is plain. While conceding the difficulty of the distinction between "lavish" and "legitimate" forms of hospitality, Parliament, the Ministry of Justice, and the SFO could have done better.
The FCPA includes an affirmative defense 185 that is somewhat more descriptive:
It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) or (g) of this section that--(2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party official, or candidate and was directly related to--( A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.
186
Thus, the FCPA has a somewhat more realistic and flexible approach to the crirninalization of hospitality payments than does the Bribery Act. However, Parliament did not have the foresight, or possibly the intent, to offer a similar defense for companies that are subject to the Bribery Act's provisions; instead, companies can rely only on the Guidance's admonition that each situation involving hospitality expenditures will be fact-specific. Surely the business community needs and deserves more from P(lrlia111ent' S_!l!<lP.Eat~~-~~gu!4a_nc_e" tlmn to merely_ ~ope _th<tt _ t~~ _ r~pu!_ation damage that an SFO investigation would engender and the huge expense of litigation would not be triggered each time a business lunch is recorded on its books. Unfortunately, this is one more example of the Bribery Act's unjust mandates, and only time will tell how such cases will actually be prosecuted it is not likely that many companies will remain unscathed for what are most likely legitimate business expenditures. In keeping with this theme, in the next section we discuss the lack of due process inherent in the
[Vol. 23:1 receive testimony on enforcement of anti-bribery laws in other jurisdictions, but no consideration was given to the unique provision in the bill applying it to businesses not organized in the United Kingdom. This strict liability offense will surely be tested in court as a violation of the ECHR's requirement of the presumption of innocence standard.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have summarized the extended history that led to the enactment of the UK Bribery Act 2010, the UK legislation required to comply with the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. After signing the OECD Convention, the British government took the position that its existing domestic anti-bribery legislation satisfied this requirement. However, others disagreed, and the OECD Working Group established to monitor compliance consistently found UK compliance to be lacking. The UK government set about reforming its existing corruption legislation, based on the recommendation of the Nolan Report and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Standards in Public Life that reform was necessary. However, the "reform" process consisted of more than a decade of debating, consulting, and infighting as various government bodies dragged their feet on agreeing on a final version of a new corruption law, specifically targeting bribery. When the Bribery Act was finally enacted, more than thirty years after the FCPA went into effect, the result, as we have shown, was, in a word, disappointing, despite Parliament's apparent goal of ending bribery in the United Kingdom and everywhere.
The offenses of active and passive bribery cover a wide spectrum of conduct and would benefit from more clear-cut, definitive guidance from the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, various terms in the Bribery Act emphasize the overly broad jurisdictional reach of the Act, which will surely have unintended consequences for companies abroad. For example, as we have discussed regarding "relevant function or activity," the acting party is guilty even where the relevant function or activity is carried out abroad. The activity need not have any connection to the United Kingdom, and the measure of what is "improper" is determined by UK standards, not by those of the foreign country where the bribing occurs. Furthermore, a relevant function or activity is performed improperly if it is performed in breach of a relevant expectation, or the failure to perform is a breach of a relevant expectation. However, the breach of a relevant expectation follows a reasonableness test, based only on what is considered "reasonable" in the United Kingdom. Likewise, an offense under Section 6, pertaining to bribery of a foreign public official, has no jurisdictional limit: a foreign public official includes anyone, whether elected or appointed, who holds a States, Australia, Switzerland, Finland, Italy and Austria.
